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MINIMUM WAGES AND UNEMPLOYMENT: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM PANEL 
DATA ON RUSSIAN REGIONS 
By 
TEN, Gi Khan 
 
ABSTRACT 
The relationship between minimum wages and unemployment is a widely debated topic among 
economists and policy makers. However, only a few attempts to study this issue on Russian labor 
market have been done.  By using one of the most effective empirical tools, which is 
Instrumental Variables approach, it was determined that minimum wages policies do have an 
adverse impact on unemployment rates in Russian regions. After exploiting an exogenous 
variation in minimum wages across regions and time, the results are expected to be unbiased and 
consistent. The results are robust to alternative model specifications.  
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CHAPTER	1.		INTRODUCTION	AND	LITERATURE	OVERVIEW.	 
Unemployment is the macroeconomic problem that severely affects state's performance. 
It's no surprise that unemployment is a common topic of debates among policy makers, that often 
claim that their proposed policies would help to improve labor market's condition. While some 
policies, such as job-training programs, did prove to be effective, minimum wages policies 
indeed remain one of the most controversial issues among academic circles and policy makers. 
Proponents of minimum wages hikes highlight that such policies can be used as a tool to reduce 
inequality by shrinking the bottom tail of a state’s income distribution  (Almeida and Terrell, 
2008). However, opponents argue that wage rigidity, or, in other words, the failure of wages to 
adjust to a level at which labor supply interacts with labor demand, is a cause of a 
disemployment effect of such policies and hence they harm, rather than protect the state’s labor 
market stability. 
1.1	Developed	Countries.	
A review of recent studies will be started from observing the evidences from the US 
labor markets. The earliest generations of studies tend to rely on time-series techniques and show 
an adverse effect of minimum wages’ raises on teenagers and non-whites (Adams, 1987; Brown, 
Gilroy and Cohen, 1982). Further researches relied predominantly on survey-based longitudinal 
and/or cross-sectional micro data and demonstrated contradictory evidences of disemployment 
effects: in some cases the estimated employment elasticities were either statistically insignificant, 
or even positive (Card and Krueger, 1994; Neumark and Wascher, 1994, 2004). These findings 
are partially consistent with a well-known monopsony model first introduced by Joan Robinson 
(1933)1: 
                                                                
1 It’s important to emphasize a partial consistency of empirical findings with theoretical predictions. For example, 
difference-in-difference estimation of the US low-wage segment of labor market conducted by Card and Krueger 
(1994) shows a significant positive effect of minimum wages’ hikes on employment in the fast-food industry. 
However, Card and Kruger emphasize that much of the burden of increased production costs were passed on by 
companies to their consumers by establishing higher prices, so that it is hard to attribute fully a positive employment 
effect to monopsony model’s theory. 
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Suppose a static, partial equilibrium in a “company town” labor market, where there are 
little options for low-wage workers and hence they have to either accept the monopsonist’s wage 
offer or leave the labor force. Hence, the company’s profit (P) is a function of revenue (R) and 
labor cost (wage (w) multiplied by number of workers (L)): 
𝑃ሺ𝐿ሻ ൌ 𝑅ሺ𝐿ሻ െ 𝑤ሺ𝐿ሻ𝑥 𝐿 
Thus, the profit maximization may be determined as following: 
𝑃ᇱሺ𝐿ሻ ൌ 𝑅ᇱ𝐿 െ ቀ𝑤ሺ𝐿ሻ х  𝐿ቁᇱ 
𝑃ᇱሺ𝐿ሻ ൌ 𝑅ᇱሺ𝐿ሻ െ 𝑤ሺ𝐿ሻᇱ х  𝐿 െ 𝑤ሺ𝐿ሻ, 
 
where maximum profit 𝑃௠௔௫ occurs when 𝑃ᇱሺ𝐿ሻ ൌ 0. Consequently, 
0 ൌ 𝑅ᇱሺ𝐿ሻ െ 𝑤ሺ𝐿ሻᇱ х  𝐿 െ 𝑤ሺ𝐿ሻ 
𝑅ᇱሺ𝐿ሻ ൌ 𝑤ሺ𝐿ሻᇱ х  𝐿 ൅ 𝑤ሺ𝐿ሻ, 
 
where 𝑅ᇱሺ𝐿ሻ is the marginal revenue product of labor (MRP), while the right-hand side of the 
equation is the marginal cost of labor (MC).  
Figure 1. Minimum Wages' effect on employment, a static monopsony model. 
 Note: The company maximizes its profit at point A, where  
MC =MRP. However, in this example minimum wages' level is established 
 higher than competitive level and therefore leads to unemployment (AB). 
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 Hence, if minimum wages increase still leads to profit gain, the company benefits on 
hiring additional workers. In the opposite case minimum wage hikes make the company fire 
workers (since the production cost exceeds revenue). 
This model, however, has not grounded lots of researches. Perhaps, this is because a 
monopsony model ignores some “shock” effects, such as raising the productivity of company’s 
operation to offset the increase in production cost. What is more important, some labor 
economists argue that only few labor markets have employers with monopsony power (Brown, 
Gilroy & Koshen, 1982; West & McKee, 1980). Finally, there are lots of other theoretical 
arguments why minimum wage hikes sometimes do lead to higher employment levels.  
As in the case of the US labor market, evidences of minimum wage’s impact on 
unemployment in other developed countries are mixed. Swidinsky (1980) claims that the 
estimated negative elasticity of teenage employment (defined as the most vulnerable segment of 
labor force) with respect to the minimum wages in Canada is sufficiently low. Thus, Swidinsky 
assures that the state’s economic costs of a moderate increase in the minimum wage distribution 
would not be unduly severe. Similar results have been observed in the Spanish labor market, 
where higher employment in all industries was associated with higher minimum wages, while a 
totally opposite effect was peculiar to young workers (Garcia, Goerlich and Orts, 1994).  
 So far, most of the evidences from developed countries converge on the following point: 
minimum wages hikes lead to substitution of skilled labor for the most vulnerable (low-skilled 
and low-productive) labor segments (mostly presented by teenagers) with low marginal 
productivity.  
1.2	Developing	Countries.	
 A large fraction of the labor force in developing countries remains outside the regulatory 
framework, being employed in the informal economy with low income, low job security and no 
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social protection (Bachetta, Ernst and Bustamante, 2009). For example, the empirical evidence 
from the Indonesian market, where informal employment accounts for almost 70% of urban 
employment, shows that raises in state’s minimum wages’ level do lead to job losses (Comola 
and Mello, 2011). However, an interesting finding is that it doesn’t result in higher overall state's 
unemployment and even increases a net increase in total (formal and informal) employment, 
since job losses in the formal sector are offset by job gains in informality. 
 Two significant economists, John R. Harris and Michael Todaro presented a general 
equilibrium model of dual economy, explaining some issues regarding rural-urban migration. 
One aspect of the model, which is minimum wages set institutionally in the urban, had been 
ignored by most of economists, however. Thus, Vassilis Paranos (2005) has given a very detailed 
discussion of the effects of minimum wages on sectoral unemployment based on original Harris-
Todaro model.  
Paranos claims, that if the elasticity of demand for labor with respect to minimum 
wages’ level is lower than one, then, employment in the urban and rural sectors will fall and 
urban unemployment will be increased. This change may be grounded by simple logical 
explanation: displaced workers either shift to the rural (informal) sector, as it has been 
demonstrated by Comola and Mello, since the probability of finding job in urban area goes 
down, or stay in the urban sector “queuing” for a formal-sector job.   
Similar impacts of minimum wages’ increase may be observed in the Russian labor 
market where a significant evidence of its adverse effect has been found. More precisely, higher 
minimum wages were found to yield an increased youth unemployment and informality 
(Muravyev and Oschepkov, 2013). These findings are not without weaknesses, however (to be 
discussed in the further chapters). 
Based on the empirical evidences presented above, one important caution should be 
emphasized. The one should be careful in equalizing such impacts as “job losses” and “increased 
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unemployment” in an attempt to study the labor market with high informality, since the 
“transition effect” draws a clear distinction between these terms (although they might be 
synonyms in developed countries). No negative impact of minimum wages’ hikes on a state 
employment doesn’t imply no disemployment effect, since displaced workers might simply shift 
to the informal sector and hence “hide” the magnitude of a minimum wages’ impact on a state’s 
job losses.  
For the rest of the developing countries the literature on how minimum wages affect 
employment and informality are rather limited and hence more researches are required for better 
comprehension of this issue. In most countries, however, teenagers and ethnic minorities remain 
to be the most vulnerable group to minimum wages’ hikes, while a high-skilled labor force keeps 
being unaffected 
1.3	Institutional	background.	
The term "Minimum wage" in Russia implies a statutory minimum wages' level being 
used for determining salaries, unemployment  benefits, taxes,  premiums and other dues. 
Employers then are obliged to pay salary no lower than established minimum wage unless the 
employee works part-time (less than 40 hours per week).  
The country has State minimum wage's level being regulated by relevant Federal Law, 
while Federal Subjects (since 2007) are allowed to establish their own level of minimum wages 
that must not exceed the nationwide one. Thus, in some Federal Subjects nominal minimum 
wage's level may exceed federal one twice or even more.  
Unlike many other countries, Russian legislative system obliges employers to pay 
minimum wages to all full-time workers, regardless of age, sex or industry. The figure below 
shows the dynamics of federal nominal minimum wages' level. 
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Figure 2. Dynamics of nominal  Federal Minimum Wage, 1999-2012. 
     
Source: Federal law on the minimum wages of The Russian Federation 
Four main questions are to be addressed in this research. First, what is the impact of 
regional minimum wages’ adjustments on the Russian Labor market in general? Second, which 
subgroups of the economically active population are the most sensitive to the adverse effect of 
such policies? Third, will the result be consistent with previous findings in the Russian labor 
market after applying an exogenous source of regional minimum wages’ variation to the model 
of estimation?  And finally, what are the potential policy implications of the findings?  
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CHAPTER	2.	AN	EMPIRICAL	EVIDENCE	FROM	PANEL	DATA	ON	RUSSIAN	
REGIONS.	
 
2.1	Data	
 
My sample covers 80 out of  83 federal subjects from 2009 to 2012. The key data source 
of the main regional macro indicators is Russian Federal State Statistics service and National 
Labor Force Survey. No cumulative dataset on regional minimum wages exists, however. Hence, 
the data was obtained from respective Federal Laws and Labor Unions' agreements  that 
establish regional minimum wages' levels.  
Additionally,  the data on average winter temperature and wind speed had been collected 
from Russian Hydrometeorological Center in order to compute a Winter Severity Index, also 
known as Bodman Index, which is one of the instruments for Minimum Wage variable. Further 
discussion of the validity of the instruments would be given in further chapters. 
A descriptive statistics of all variables is given at Annex-I. 
2.2	The	Empirical	Setting.	
Let's consider the following equation, based on a standard neoclassical model of 
unemployment as a function of minimum wages and inflation: 
log 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡௜௧  = 𝛽ଵ𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑟𝑀𝑊௜௧  + 𝛽ଶ𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛௜௧ + 𝑋ᇱ௜௧𝛽  + 𝐴ᇱ௜𝛾 + 𝑢௜௧            
(1)          
where 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡௜௧  denotes U, T, Y, A, LE, HE or INF; 𝑟𝑀𝑊௜௧ is real minimum wage (in 
2008 prices), 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛௜௧  is a regional inflation, 𝐴ᇱ௜  is a set of unobserved time-invariant 
covariates, 𝑋ᇱ௜௧ denotes a vector of regional-level covariates and 𝜀௜௧ is the error term. 
 It's worth to emphasize at this point that researches all around the world use different 
minimum wages variables in their attempts to identify their causal effect on unemployment. For 
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example, one of the most popular variables, which also grounded the most recent study of 
Russian labor market (Muravyev and Oschepkov,  2013), is so-called Kaitz index, defined as a 
minimum wage over mean wages ratio adjusted for coverage (Kaitz, 1970).This ratio has its pros 
and cons, however. While, to certain extent, it does make sense to attribute different labor market 
outcomes to this ratio (that has a greater variation in its definition), the one should clearly 
understand, that an estimated elasticity is also being driven by the denominator of Kaitz index 
(regional mean wages). Keeping in mind the existence of other minimum wage variables 
(fraction affected, the fraction at, the fraction below and so forth), it's almost impossible to 
compare the results of different studies. The estimation strategy of my research is then to exploit 
an ordinary variation of real minimum wages across different regions in different years (since, as 
it's mentioned in previous chapters, the same amount minimum wage is applied to all segments 
of workers in a given region) and consequently come up with a direct interpretation of  an 
estimated causal effect.  
 Another problem that, so far, has been generally ignored by many researchers, is a 
reverse casualty that inevitably leads to biased estimation. Card and Krueger (1994) say, 
"Politicians from states in which an increase in the minimum wages is expected to have a strong 
effect on ... employment opportunities might oppose the increase, whereas those from states in 
which an expected effect is smaller might support it. In order to shed some light on this issue, 
following Baskaya and Rubinstein (2012), let's assume that local policy makers in a given region 
decide whether to keep local wage floors above federal one or not, following standard economic 
utility maximization theory: 
ω୤ୱ ൌ 1 ሺU୤ୱ∗ ൌ fሺ⦁ሻ ൒ 0ሻ, 
where ω୤ୱ  is policy makers' propensity to keep minimum wages in federal subject equal to 
federal level and U୤ୱ∗  is a latent index of "utility" from such decision that, in turns, depends on a 
function fሺ⦁ሻ  of observable and unobservable factors. The traditional propensity is then a 
probability that ω୤ୱ ൌ 1 conditional on  fሺ⦁ሻ.  However, even if a perfect data set of all factors 
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affecting legislators' decision regarding the magnitude of local minimum wage's level had been 
available, it would have barely eliminated the endogeneity problem. The reason is that the policy 
makers, being aware of an ambiguity of the consequences of their decision, are unlikely to push 
wages up in federal subjects, where unemployment is severe.  If this assumption is true, then 
equation (1) actually implies: 
log 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡௜௧ = 𝛽ଵ𝑓ሺ𝑦ሻ௜௧ + 𝑋ᇱ௜௧𝛽 + 𝐴ᇱ௜𝛾+𝑢௜௧, 
where, higher unemployment rate means higher probability that ω୤ୱ would be equal to 1(since 
federal subjects, again, can't hold local minimum wage's level lower than federal) and hence the 
covariance of rMW and Unemployment is negative. Thus, as n→ ∞, the bias of Least Square 
Estimator would be the following: 
plim൫𝛽ଵ෢൯ ൌ  𝛽ଵ െ  𝑐𝑜𝑣ሺ𝑟𝑀𝑊, 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡ሻ𝑣𝑎𝑟ሺ𝑟𝑀𝑊ሻ  
 
𝛽ଵ ൌ  plim൫𝛽ଵ෢൯ ൅ 𝑐𝑜𝑣ሺ𝑟𝑀𝑊, 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡ሻ𝑣𝑎𝑟ሺ𝑟𝑀𝑊ሻ , 
which means that  OLS estimator 𝛽ଵ෢ has a downward bias. A possible solution of the problem is 
an instrumental variable approach that is expected to produce unbiased and consistent estimators.  
 By definition, good instruments must be correlated with regional minimum wages but 
uncorrelated with any characteristics of labor market that may affect unemployment. Following 
Neumark and Wascher (1992), I include mean of the minimum wage level in geographically 
bordering federal subjects as my first instrument. The logic behind is the following: local policy 
makers are likely to observe the effect of minimum wages' hikes in neighboring federal subjects' 
labor markets. Higher minimum wages in neighboring federal subjects are then expected to 
affect positively the likelihood of pushing minimum wages' level up in a local labor market. 
Minimum wages in neighboring federal subjects, however, may be suspected to affect local labor 
market by attracting labor force to the regions with higher minimum wages, in which case the so-
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called instrument should be included as an independent variable in the unemployment equation. 
This suspicion, however, has no ground to be valid, since the benefits from the migration in such 
a big country as The Russian Federation are likely to be offset by costs of moving in other 
regions for the sake of earning higher minimum wage. 
 The second instrument requires a more detailed discussion. If to review Russian labor 
market from the historical prospective, the one may notice, that in some regions, though 
unemployment rates were high, minimum wages were kept higher than federal floor. This 
phenomenon  is explained by the existence of so-called Northern Multiplier: in the North and Far 
East, where the winter is much colder than in other regions,  workers were paid higher minimum 
wages regardless of the labor market's condition. This was, according to the Labor Code of the 
Russian Federation, one of the forms of social benefits for workers living in regions with tough 
northern climate.  The computation of minimum wages in federal subjects where Northern 
Multiplier existed, was straightforward:  
Regional MW = Federal MW x Northern Multiplier, 
where Northern Multiplier (depending on the closeness to the North) was varying from 1.1 to 2. 
For example, in 2006, while federal minimum wage's level was 1100, the workers in Chukotsky 
Autonomous Okrug (where Northern Multiplies was 2) were receiving 2200, although local 
unemployment rate was up to 3 higher than in regions that had no Northern Multiplier and hence 
kept wages equal to federal level.     
 Although the Northern Multiplier did explain the variation of minimum wages across 
regions, it may not be considered as a good instrument. First, the Northern Multiplier is a time-
invariant index that would have been eliminated by fixed-effect regression. Second, the concept 
of Northern Multiplier existed only until the middle of 2007 and hence is not able to explain the 
variation of minimum wages in subsequent years. Finally, the value of different indices across 
the regions is not purely exogenous and therefore doesn't satisfy the assumption of exclusion 
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restriction. After 2007, however, some regions did keep regional minimum wages higher than 
federal despite the unemployment rates. Coincidently, most of those federal subjects, where 
Northern Multiplier existed, remained to be unrestricted by federal minimum wages, which 
pushes towards the following question: what determines the variation of minimum wages in 
those regions?  
 Lemos (2004) used political variables as instruments for endogenous  minimum wages. 
The primary strategy was the following: first, the data on votes in favor and against minimum 
wages' hikes were collected under assumption that larger number of politicians standing for 
workers' rights increases the likeliness of establishment a higher wages' level; second, the 
election data was collected following Sobel's (1999) observation, that historically minimum 
wages, being a tool of political propaganda, have been increasing few days before the elections 
over the entire history of US, starting from the establishment of Fair Labor Standards Act.   
 In line with the evidence given above, let's assume that the likelihood of enactment 
higher minimum wages is determined by the political power of labor union bargaining for them 
in a particular federal subject in the Russian Federation. If this assumption is correct, then, 
regional policy makers are likely to observe the labor market outcomes of minimum wages' 
increases in the past.  If past unemployment held at the acceptable level, then, regional policy 
makers would be more likely to agree to push minimum wage above federal standards. 
 Political power of labor union is just one part of the story, however, since a good 
argument for minimum wages' increase should be provided for the sake of reaching the 
agreement with regional politicians. Keeping in mind the concept of Northern Multiplier, it is 
logically to assume, that labor unions, being representatives or workers' rights, may consider a 
winter severity as an argument for pushing wages up for the sake of improving living conditions 
of low-income population.  If the winter becomes more severe in a particular region, then labor 
unions obtain a stronger ground to bargain for higher minimum wages.  
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 The most obvious measurement of winter severity is an average temperature. This 
measurement is not without disadvantages, however. First, the temperature itself is likely to 
correlate with many factors left in residual and hence may not be considered as a truly exclusive 
instrument. Second, it fails to take into account other factors affecting human's perception of 
winter severity, such as precipitation intensity, wind speed and atmospheric humidity.    
One of winter severity's measurements was developed in 1910 by Swedish scientist 
Goesta Bodman. In his summary of the research expedition to the South Pole in 1901-1903, the 
researcher gave an attempt to objectively quantify the subjective human perception of winter 
severity. The scientist argues, that human's body is far more sensitive to the strength of the wind 
rather than to the low temperature. The formula of Bodman Index looks as follows: 
𝑆 ൌ ሺ1 െ 0.04 ൈ 𝑡ሻ ൈ ሺ1 ൅ 0.27 ൈ 𝑣ሻ, 
where 𝑡 is the temperature (measured in °C) and 𝑣 is the wind speed (measured in meters per 
second). The higher is the value of 𝑆, the worse is the human's perception of the winter. Indeed, 
the equation clearly reflects Bodman's opinion: the wind is given higher weight in the formula of 
winter perception. If the temperature is -25 °C and the wind speed is 1 meters per second, then, 
the Bodman Index is equal to 2.54, while if the temperature is -8 °C and the wind speed is 17 
meters per second, the Index is then equal to 7.38. This fact is explained by the harmful effect of 
the wind expressed in ensuing breathing difficulty, mechanical pressure on the body and 
debilitated insulating properties of winter cloth (Bodman, 1916).  
 The paradox of an objective measurement of a subjective winter severity's perception 
distinguishes  Bodman Index, as a potential candidate for inclusion in the first-stage regression, 
from Northern Multiplier and average winter temperature.  First of all, it varies over time and, as 
it will be shown in subsequent chapters, does drive the variance of minimum wages across 
Russian regions. Second, although the temperature is a part of the formula, it doesn't correlate 
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with Bodman Index across regions, since the value of the Index is mostly driven by the wind 
speed and hence may be totally different even in those parts of Russia, where the temperature 
level is totally identical.  This, in turns, means, that Bodman Index may be considered as a truly 
exclusive instrument for the endogenous regressor. 
 The first stage then exhibits the following structure:  
            𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑟𝑀𝑊௜௧ ൌ  αଵlog 𝐵𝑜𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑛௜௧ ൅  αଶ𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑀𝑊௜௧ ൅  𝑋ᇱ௜௧𝛼 ൅ 𝐴ᇱ௜𝜌 ൅
 𝜖௜௧                            (2) 
The reduced-form unemployment equation is2: 
             log 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡௜௧ = 𝜋ଵ𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑟𝑀𝑊ప௧෣  + 𝜋ଶ𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛௜௧ + 𝑋ᇱ௜௧𝜋 + 𝐴ᇱ௜𝜃+𝜈௜௧,           
(3) 
where 𝑟𝑀𝑊ప௧෣  is the part of initially endogenous  𝑟𝑀𝑊௜௧ that is left after removal of  𝜖௜௧ that was 
correlating with the error term 𝑢௜௧ in the initial model (1). 
 An important issue regarding the model (3) is whether year effects should be included in 
the equation. Some researchers do control for year dummies assuming the existence of cohort-
size effects that are not captured by regressors, which are usually used in minimum wages 
studies. The present research, however, studies the period of relatively stable post-crisis Russian 
economy that covers only four years. Additionally, after inclusion of regional inflation 
(following Phillips' (1958) theory) and regional GDP per capita (as an indicator of regional 
development), no reasons to believe in the existence of unexplained year effect are left. 
                                                                
2 An error term 𝜈௜௧ is allowed to be correlated in the same cluster (federal subjects) over time, but not across 
different clusters. Since the sample covers 80 out of 83 federal subjects, but short period (4 years), the resulting 
standard errors are completely robust to serial correlation and heteroskedasticity (Liang and Zeger, 1986; Angrist 
and Pischke , 2008) 
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2.3	Empirical	results.	
A. OLS Estimates.  
 Estimates of equation (1) ,with unemployment measured by dividing total number of 
unemployed workers that are actively seeking for a job by total number of labor force in the 
region i and transforming this ratio in a logarithmic form . Table 2 reports OLS estimates. 
Table 1. OLS Estimates and the Determinant of Unemployment rates in Russian regions 
 
 Log Log Log Log 
VARIABLES Unemployment
(1) 
Unemployment
(2) 
Unemployment 
(3) 
Unemployment
(4) 
     
Log (Real Minimum Wage) -0.901*** -0.403*** -0.344*** -0.256** 
 (0.106) (0.109) (0.106) (0.109) 
 
Log (Inflation) 
 
3.080*** 
 
-0.042 
 
-0.009 
 
-1.424** 
 (0.660) (0.646) (0.638) (0.710) 
 
Log (GDP per capita) 
  
-0.507*** 
 
-0.195*** 
 
-0.223* 
  (0.053) (0.075) (0.131) 
 
Log (University Graduates) 
  
-0.083** 
 
-0.125*** 
 
0.124 
  (0.037) (0.035) (0.143) 
 
Log (Working Age Population) 
  
0.399*** 
 
0.345** 
 
4.380*** 
  (0.151) (0.141) (1.171) 
 
Log (Real Living Cost) 
   
-0.712*** 
 
-0.490** 
   (0.143) (0.195) 
 
Log (Army) 
   
-0.009 
 
0.014 
   (0.038) (0.041) 
 
Regional fixed effects NO NO NO YES 
Observations 325 318 313 313 
R-squared 0.43 0.64 0.66 0.69 
Number of regions 83 81 80 80 
Standard errors clustered at regional level are reported  in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 Surprisingly, the estimates of the equation (1) reported in column 4 show a significant 
negative minimum wages elasticity of unemployment. As it will be discussed in further chapters, 
consistently with past evidences, this coefficient reflects workers' decision to move out from 
"queueing" unemployment to either inactive population and/or the informal sector (Comola and 
Mello, 2011; Muravyev and Oschepkov, 2013). Following this logic, the effect of minimum 
wages on informality regional rates is to be tested in further parts of the present research.  
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 Meanwhile, all other significant coefficients have expected sign in line with previous 
findings and basic economic theory. Inflation, as it had been predicted by many economists 
(Phillips, 1958; Fisher, 1973; Chang, 1997), on average reduces regional unemployment by 
1.4%, while GDP per capita, as an indicator of regional development, has much weaker, though 
significant effect (-0.2%). 
B. IV Estimates. 
 Following past studies, the primary focus of the research was a heterogeneity of 
minimum wages' effect. Table 2 reports estimated elasticity of unemployment rates among 
different age groups of economically active population: total (people aged from 15 to 72), 
teenagers (15-19), youth (20-29), adults and elderly (29-72). In these specifications teenagers 
and youth are proxies for unskilled and inexperienced workers, which allow testing a potential 
diemployment effect of minimum wages' increase on those subgroups of population, that had 
been found in past studies. 
 Panel A of table reports 2SLS estimates of the parameters 𝜋 from the equation (3), while 
Panel B shows the corresponding first stages. Consistently with previous studies, columns (2) 
and (3) show a strong disemployment effect of minimum wages hikes on teenagers and youth: 
the estimated elasticity are 0.68% and 0.84% respectively.  
  At this stage it is particularly important to point out, that 3 statistics proving the validity 
of instruments chosen are also reported in Panel B: 
1. F-statistic of excluded instrument: after Staiger, Douglas and Stock (1997) had formalized the 
definition of "weak instruments", some researchers concluded, that F-stat higher than 10 is a 
valid indicator of statistically "strong" instruments. Otherwise, the instruments are considered to 
be weak and thus may yield biased estimator (Stock and Yogo, 2005). While some researchers3 
                                                                
3 For more detailed discussion on this issue, read  James H Stock, Jonathan H Wright and Motohiro Yogo "A survey 
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argue on the reasonability of this "rule of thumb", it's still important to report this statistic. The 
value of F-statistic of excluded instrument is far higher than 10 under each specification, which 
gives a ground to believe that the reported coefficient of the endogenous covariate is unbiased 
and consistent. 
2. Hansen J test of overidentifying restrictions with corresponding p-values. The null hypothesis 
is that instruments are not correlated with the residual and that instruments are correctly 
excluded from the estimated equation.  
Table 2. IV Estimates of minimum wages' effect on unemployment rate among different 
subgroups of population (segmented by age) 
 
VARIABLES Total  
(log)  
(1) 
Teenagers  
(log) 
(2) 
Youth 
(log) 
(3) 
Adults and 
elderly(log) 
(4) 
 
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares 
 
Log (Real Minimum Wage) 
 
-0.418** 
 
0.686*** 
 
0.838*** 
 
-0.624** 
 (0.189) (0.175) (0.157) (0.315) 
Log (Inflation) -1.595*** 
(0.543) 
1.354 1.033 -2.589*** 
 (0.953) (0.695) (0.762) 
Log (GDP per capita) -0.230 -0.023 0.183 -0.480** 
 (0.152) (0.172) (0.121) (0.222) 
Log (University Graduates) 0.281 0.012 0.161 0.496** 
 (0.181) (0.268) (0.193) (0.231) 
Log (Working Age Population) 4.045*** -9.260*** 0.047 3.696** 
 (1.482) (3.377) (0.955) (1.739) 
Log (Real Living Cost) -0.457** -0.069 -0.072 -0.862*** 
 (0.226) (0.308) (0.183) (0.303) 
Log (Army) 0.003 0.011 0.022 0.033 
 (0.034) (0.067) (0.046) (0.044) 
Regional Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
 
Panel B: First Stage for Minimum Wage 
 
Log (Bodman Index) 
 
0.985*** 
 
0.987*** 
 
0.988*** 
 
0.988** 
 
Log (Mean Wages of 
Neighboring Regions) 
(0.067) 
0.143 
(0.105) 
(0.068) 
0.152 
(0.115) 
(0.067) 
0.144 
(0.106) 
(0.067) 
0.144 
(0.106) 
Log (Inflation) -0.236 -2.33 -0.215 -0.215 
 (0.254) (0.256) (0.258) (0.258) 
Log (GDP per capita) 0.020 0.018 0.027 0.027 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.258) 
Log (University Graduates) 0.122 0.121 0.129 0.129 
 (0.089) (0.089) (0.095) (0.095) 
Log (Working Age Population) 0.168 0.177 0.156 0.156 
 (0.509) (0.512) (0.522) (0.523) 
Log (Real Living Cost) 0.017 0.017 0.001 0.002 
                                                                                                                                                                                                              
of weak instruments and weak identification in Generalized Method of Moments", Journal of Business & Economic 
Statistics; Oct 2002.  
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 (0.064) (0.063) (0.071) (0.072) 
Log (Army) 0.031 0.031 0.034 0.034 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.045) (0.045) 
Regional Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
F-stat of excl. instruments 
Hansen J statistic 
136.6 
 0.33 
125.7 
0.48 
135.7 
2.17 
135.4 
1.46 
(Chi-sq (1) P-value) 
Observations 
(0.56) 
295 
(0.49) 
293 
(0.14) 
291 
(0.23) 
292 
Number of regions 75 75 74 75 
Adjusted R-squared 0.581 0.361 0.192 0.698 
Standard errors clustered at regional level are reported  in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 As it is discussed in previous chapters, IV estimator of unemployment elasticity with 
respect to minimum wages is lower than OLS's one. However, this result is valid under the 
assumption that minimum wage is the only channel through which instruments affect regional 
unemployment. If this is correct, then, the instruments suggested in this research, shouldn't affect 
unemployment rates in those countries, where minimum wages don't exist.  
 In order to test this assumption, a so-called falsification test was undertaken: I use one 
additional sample (a 8 years panel data set, from 2005 to 2012) that consists of 19 countries4 that 
have no minimum wages regulation. Those countries are: Namibia, Qatar ,Denmark, Finland, 
Tonga, Italy, Sweden, Yemen, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Singapore, Iceland, United Arab 
Emirates, Liechtenstein, Zimbabwe, Kiribati, Burundi, Djibouti.  Following the above logic, it's 
expected that Bodman Index5 (after controlling for other covariates) would have no significant  
impact on unemployment across the sample.  
  Column 1 in Table 4 shows the reduced-form estimates of the interactions between 
unemployment and Bodman Index in Russian regions. As it is shown, Bodman Index has a 
strong negative impact on regional unemployment rates. Column 2 reports reduced-form 
estimates within a new sample of 19 countries with no minimum wages policies6. The column 
                                                                
4 26 countries have no regulations of minimum wages. However, the sample covers only 19 countries since it's 
almost impossible to collect data for computing Bodman Index in some areas.  The list of countries with no 
minimum wages policies was found in "Country reports for Human Rights practices". 
5 Bodman Index was computed as a weighted average winter temperature in critically Northern and Southern parts 
of the countries. In tropical countries Bodman Index has a negative value.  
6 Column 2 reports the estimator of an absolute value of Bodman Index (not logarithmic form), since in the 
countries  with tropical climate Bodman Index takes a negative value. Other covariates, such as inflation, GDP per 
capita (in 2000 prices),  working age population and primary school enrollment rates are also included in the 
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displays no systematic relationship between Bodman Index and states' unemployment rates7. 
 After testing the assumptions quantitatively, no doubts regarding the validity of the 
instruments should be left. 
Table 3. Reduced Form Relationship between Bodman Index and Unemployment Rate 
 
 Russian Regions Other Countries 
VARIABLES (1)  (2) 
   
Bodman Index, log -0.38***  
 (0.141)  
Bodman Index  -0.19 
  (0.392) 
 
CONTROLS YES YES 
FIXED EFFECTS YES YES 
Observations 313 87 
N 80 19 
R-squared 0.695 0.289 
Standard errors clustered at regional/country level are reported  in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
  
 Moving back to the issue of heterogeneity of impact of minimum wages increase, It's also 
important whether such polices affect workers differently depending on their level of education. 
It's also important to identify the causal effect of minimum wages on the size of informal sector, 
since, as it had been noted before, an estimated  negative elasticity 𝜋ଵ may be a result of  the 
transition effect between two sectors.     
 The unemployment rate among low-educated is defined as an amount of unemployed 
workers, with no higher education, divided by working age population ratio. The unemployment 
rate among high-educated workers is then defined as a total number of unemployed workers with 
higher education divided by the reference population. Finally, informality rate is defined as a 
share of informal-sector employees in the working age population.  
 In line with expectations, column 2 reports a 0.99% increase of unemployment  rates 
                                                                                                                                                                                                              
model. Data source: World Bank. 
7 Unfortunately, the falsification test for the second instrument, mean value of minimum wages in geographically 
neighboring regions, can't be proceeded for obvious reasons. 
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among low-educated as a response to higher minimum wages' enactment. Surprisingly, column 3 
shows a significant negative estimator. In an ideal case, the adverse effect of minimum wages 
increase should be studied by inclusion official employment rates among different segments of 
population on the left-hand side of the equation (3), which would have produced a more reliable 
inference regarding to the effect of such policies. Unfortunately, the absence of such data doesn't 
allow producing such estimation and hence the inference should be guided by existing literature. 
 Table 4. IV Estimates of minimum wages' effect on unemployment rate among different 
subgroups of population (segmented by the level of education) 
 
VARIABLES Log Total 
Unemployment
(1) 
Log(un) among
Low-Educated
(2) 
Log(un) among 
High-Educated 
(3) 
Informality
Rate (log) 
(4) 
 
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares 
 
Log (Real Minimum Wage) 
 
-0.418** 
 
0.920*** 
(0.085) 
 
-0.582** 
(0.232) 
 
1.157*** 
(0.055)  (0.189) 
Log (Inflation) -1.595*** 
(0.543) 
-0.371 -0.926 0.510 
 (0.416) (0.943) (0.336) 
Log (GDP per capita) -0.230 0.025 -0.207 0.092* 
 (0.152) (0.083) (0.222) (0.050) 
Log (University Graduates) 0.281 -0.060 0.190 -0.091 
 (0.181) (0.099) (0.273) (0.078) 
Log (Working Age Population) 4.045*** -0.952 4.033** -0.387 
 (1.482) (0.728) (1.896) (0.453) 
Log (Real Living Cost) -0.457** -0.134 -0.140 -0.231*** 
 (0.226) (0.114) (0.283) (0.069) 
Log (Army) 0.003 -0.032 -0.025 -0.007 
 (0.034) (0.022) (0.058) (0.019) 
Regional Fixed Effects 
 
YES YES YES YES 
 
Panel B: First Stage for Minimum Wage 
 
Log (Bodman Index) 
 
0.985*** 
 
0.987*** 
 
0.988*** 
 
0.988** 
 
Log (Mean Wages of 
Neighboring Regions) 
(0.067) 
0.143 
(0.105) 
(0.068) 
0.152 
(0.115) 
(0.067) 
0.144 
(0.106) 
(0.067) 
0.144 
(0.106) 
Log (Inflation) -0.236 -2.33 -0.215 -0.215 
 (0.254) (0.256) (0.258) (0.258) 
Log (GDP per capita) 0.020 0.018 0.027 0.027 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.258) 
Log (University Graduates) 0.122 0.121 0.129 0.129 
 (0.089) (0.089) (0.095) (0.095) 
Log (Working Age Population) 0.168 0.177 0.156 0.156 
 (0.509) (0.512) (0.522) (0.523) 
Log (Real Living Cost) 0.017 0.017 0.001 0.002 
 (0.064) (0.063) (0.071) (0.072) 
Log (Army) 0.031 0.031 0.034 0.034 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.045) (0.045) 
Regional Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
F-stat of excl. instruments 136.6 136.6  152.7  151.6 
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Hansen J statistic 
(Chi-sq (1) P-value) 
0.33 
(0.57) 
0.07 
(0.79) 
1.90 
(0.17) 
0.34 
(0.56) 
Number of regions 75 75 75 75 
Adjusted R-squared 0.581 0.589 0.229 0.742 
     
Standard errors clustered at regional level are reported  in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
  
 Therefore, following (Comola and Mello, 2011; Muravyev and Oschepkov, 2013), the 
only rationale explanation of joint observation of the results in columns (3) and (4) is that 
discouraged workers simply give up seeking for a job in a formal sector and hence the magnitude 
of unemployment rates decreases when minimum wages raise up, while the size of uncovered 
sector increases. 
2.4	Robustness	checks.	
 
 The baseline results rely on the assumption that two instruments are valid and hence 
estimated coefficient of minimum wages are unbiased and consistent in the presence of reverse 
causality problem. If this is true, then, the results must be robust to alternative minimum wages' 
variables largely exploited by different researchers all around the world.  
 As it had been noted before, in the recent study of Russian labor market the relative 
variation of minimum wages or so-called Kaitz Index was used as the main regressor of the 
model of estimation (Muravyev and Oschepkov, 2013). The authors say, that the usage of lagged 
value of the denominator (regional mean wages) of Kaitz Index  eliminates the impact of 
minimum wages increase on the average wage. Thus, following Muravyev and Oschepkov 
(2013), Kaitz index was computed following the formula given below8: 
𝐾𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑧௜௧ ൌ  ெ௜௡௜௠௨௠ ௐ௔௚௘೔೟஺௩௘௥௔௚௘ ௐ௔௚௘೔೟షభ  ൈ  100  
 Thus, the new reduced- form unemployment equation with minimum wage variable 
substituted for Kaitz index looks like as follows: 
                                                                
8 A detailed discussion of choosing optimal lags of the denominator of Kaitz index is given in a corresponding 
research.  
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log 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡௜௧ = 𝜑ଵ𝐾𝑎𝚤𝑡𝑧ప௧෣  + 𝜑ଶ𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛௜௧ + 𝑋ᇱ௜௧𝜑 + 𝐴ᇱ௜𝛾+ћ௜௧, 
The first stage then exhibits the following structure:  
            𝐾𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑧௜௧ ൌ  δଵlog 𝐵𝑜𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑛௜௧ ൅  δଶ𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑀𝑊௜௧ ൅  𝑋ᇱ௜௧𝛿 ൅  𝐴ᇱ௜𝜏 ൅ 𝜐௜௧                    
 The baseline findings appeared to be robust to substitution minimum wages' variable for 
Kaitz Index. The results, reported in Tables 7,8 show that Kaitz Index's hikes leads to increased 
unemployment among teenagers, youth and low-educated workers. A negative impact of Kaitz 
index on total employment also pushes towards the suggestion that minimum wages hikes 
discourage workers shifting them away from a formal sector of the Russian economy. 
Table 5. IV Estimates of minimum wages' effect on unemployment rate among different 
subgroups of population (segmented by age) 
 
VARIABLES Total Unemployment 
(log) 
(1) 
Teenagers 
(log) 
(2) 
Youth 
(log) 
(3) 
Adults and elderly
(log) 
(4) 
 
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares 
 
Kaitz Index -1.225** 2.015*** 2.442*** -1.853* 
 (0.554) (0.510) (0.433) (0.949) 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
Regional Fixed Effects 
 
YES YES YES YES 
 
Panel B: First Stage for Kaitz Index 
 
Log (Bodman Index) 
 
0.334*** 
 
0.333*** 
 
0.333*** 
 
0.334*** 
 
Log (Mean Wages of 
Neighboring Regions) 
(0.025) 
0.061* 
(0.032) 
(0.026) 
0.063* 
(0.034) 
(0.025) 
0.06* 
(0.032) 
(0.025) 
0.06* 
(0.032) 
Controls 
Regional Fixed Effects 
 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
F-stat of excl. instruments 
Hansen J statistic 
100.4 
 0.28 
92.5 
0.39 
99.6 
2.43 
99.5 
1.46 
(Chi-sq (1) P-value) 
Observations 
(0.6) 
295 
(0.54) 
293 
(0.12) 
291 
(0.23) 
292 
Number of regions 75 75 74 75 
Adjusted R-squared 0.565 0.305 0.111 0.679 
Standard errors clustered at regional level are reported  in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
The finding that higher minimum wages lead to lower unemployment among different 
segments of workers may be also thought as a result of so-called "lighthouse effect", a term 
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employed if the minimum wages' hikes in formal sector positively affect wages in a shadow 
economy and hence, once again, moves " queuing "  unemployed workers from covered into  
uncovered sector.  Consistently with previous studies (Comola and Mello, 2011; Khamis 2008), 
this seems to be a valid suggestion regarding to Russian labor market: the estimated informality 
rate's elasticity for minimum wages is positive in both model specifications. 
 
 
Table 6. IV Estimates of minimum wages' effect on unemployment rate among different 
subgroups of population (segmented by the level of education) 
 
 
 Low-Educated (log) High-Educated (log) Informality (log)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
 
  Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares 
 
Kaitz Index 2.677*** -1.674** 3.329*** 
 (0.318) (0.656) (0.221) 
Controls 
Regional Fixed Effects 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
 
  Panel B: First Stage for Kaitz Index 
    
Log (Bodman Index) 0.334*** -0.335** 0.334*** 
 
Log (Mean Wages of 
Neighboring Regions) 
(0.025) 
0.061* 
(0.032) 
(0.026) 
0.06* 
(0.032) 
(0.025) 
0.59* 
(0.032) 
Controls 
Regional Fixed Effects 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
F-stat of excl. instruments 
Hansen J statistic 
(Chi-sq (1) P-value) 
100.4 
0.25 
(0.62) 
98.1 
1.99 
(0.16) 
97.5 
0.2 
(0.64) 
Observations 295 293 291 
Number of regions 75 75 75 
Adjusted R-squared 0.478 0.225 0.529 
Standard errors clustered at regional level are reported  in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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CHAPTER	3.	CONCLUSION	AND	POLICY	IMPLICATIONS.	
 
 The present study draws the connection between minimum wages and unemployment in 
Russian regions in both theoretical and empirical manner. The study also focuses on the 
heterogeneity of minimum wages' impact on regional labor markets, as it had been done by many 
researchers all around the world. 
 Neoclassic economic theory suggests, that a government's failure to adjust wages to the 
equilibrium level, at which labor supply equals to labor demand causes structural unemployment. 
This phenomenon occurs because of a mismatch between the number of people who want to 
work and the number of working places that economy can produce. Therefore, minimum wage 
policies, initially targeted at improving the living standards of the poorest, may in fact reduce the 
quantity of labor demanded and hence decrease the number of people employed in a formal 
sector of economy. Thus, this research is an attempt to make a contribution to the ongoing debate 
of opponents and proponents of minimum wage laws by showing empirical evidence from 
Russian labor market. 
 The research used an Instrumental Variables approach to produce an unbiased estimation 
of minimum wages impact on unemployment in the presence of endogeneity problem, which has 
not been considered in many of past studies. After inclusion of other covariates affecting 
unemployment in Russian regions, the IV estimators showed a strong and significant adverse 
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impact of minimum wages on unskilled workers with low productivity, defined, following the 
literature, as teenagers, youth and low-educated employees. The research also gives evidence 
that minimum wages increase excludes discouraged workers from the labor force and hence 
enlarges the size of an uncovered sector of state's economy.  
 The study offers several policy implications. First of all, more flexible approach 
regarding to the determination of the value of minimum wages should be considered. Both 
demand-side factors, such as firms' performance, industries' specifics, elasticity of substitution 
between labor and capital in different sectors of state economy, and labor supply-side factors, 
such as educational level, the composition of regional labor force, workers' productivity, should 
be considered in order to identify an optimal minimum wages for different segments of 
population, depending on industries and/or personal workers' characteristics, such as age, 
experience and so forth. Second, Russian Labor Code obliges employers to pay the same amount 
of minimum wages to all people regardless of their age, gender or industry unless their work less 
than 40 hours per week. Perhaps, this "All or Nothing" framework is what explains a very strong 
adverse effect of such policies on Russian labor market, since companies, facing increased 
production costs caused by increased minimum wages, are not given a halfway house between 
lowering the profit and firing employed workers. Hence, the enactment of minimum hourly 
wages, as it is done in the U.S, Canada, South Korea and many other countries, should be 
considered. Finally, while current minimum wages' policies are to be crafted more carefully, 
other tools of income redistribution and improving living standards also seem to require more 
attention. For example, regional policy makers might consider the provision of more incentives 
for new companies to locate in areas with high employment. An introduction of vocational 
programs in order to re-skill disemployed workers might also increase the likelihood of lowering 
the vulnerability of unskilled labor force, in those regions, where winter is particularly severe, 
local policy makers may consider an imposition of lower taxes as an alternative option for 
minimum wages increase. 
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ANNEX‐I	
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
 
 
Variable                                                                              N  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
1. Dependent Variables 
Average overall unemployment rate, log (U)  332 1.978581 0.43405  ‐0.22314 3.768153
Average teenage unemployment rate (15‐19 years 
old), log (T)  318 ‐2.72162 0.632292  ‐7.38841 ‐1.33748
Average  youth  unemployment  rate  (20‐29  years 
old), log (Y)  316 1.696239 0.431368  0.393231 3.508899
Average  adults  unemployment  rate  (older  than 
30), log (A)  328 1.561609 0.470331  ‐1.33181 3.298949
Average unemployment rate among low‐educated 
workers, log (LE)  321 1.812497 0.430504  0.392042 3.639426
Average unemployment rate among high‐educated 
workers, log (HE)  329 0.90505 0.384243  ‐0.75502 2.127041
Average informality rate, log (INF)  316 2.352149 0.476079  0.019573 3.475878
Kaitz Index  324 31.21137 7.764126  9.634953 62.27528
2. Independent Variables 
Real minimum wage at  the beginning of  the year, 
log  325 8.447458 0.21252  8.24326 9.297165
Inflation at the beginning of the year, log  332 0.07455 0.018447  0.013903 0.158882
Average gross Regional Product per capita, log  326 12.17554 0.658827  10.40507 15.13604
Proportion of university graduates, log  324 9.222901 1.032325  6.684612 12.52598
Average working age population, log  332 ‐0.51574 0.249491  ‐2.78447 ‐0.31708
Real living cost at the beginning of the year, log  332 8.627178 0.249717  8.159012 9.448243
Proportion of population serving in army, log  322 ‐7.64131 0.54128  ‐9.92416 ‐6.34962
Bodman Index, log  327 1.39417 0.362799  0.182322 2.104134
Mean nominal wage of geographically neighboring 
region, log   304 8.497533 0.113733  8.373322 9.10498
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